University of Southern Maine

USM Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

School of Business

2012

Exploring the Role of Pseudodeductibles in Auto Insurance Claims
Reporting
Dana A. Kerr PhD
University of Southern Maine, dana.kerr@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/business-faculty
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Kerr, Dana A., 2012, “Exploring the Role of Pseudodeductibles in Auto Insurance Claims Reporting,”
Journal of Insurance Issues, 35(1): 44-72.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Business at USM Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of USM Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact jessica.c.hovey@maine.edu.

Exploring the Role of
Pseudodeductibles in Auto
Insurance Claims Reporting
Dana A. Kerr1

Abstract: Many who purchase insurance understand that by reporting covered losses
to their insurers they increase the chances of future premium increases or reductions
in insurance coverage. If under such circumstances a policyholder decides not to report
an otherwise covered loss, the policyholder is effectively displaying the presence of a
“pseudodeductible.” That is, given a covered loss occurs, a policyholder may define a
personal and unobservable threshold that is greater than any stated deductible in the
policy below which an insurance claim for the loss will not be reported. The scant
amount of empirical research on this topic suffers from a lack of information about
losses for which insurance claims were never filed. This research relies on a unique
dataset that captures when policyholders choose to forgo insurance claims and why.
The findings increase our understanding of the role that pseudodeductibles play in the
claims reporting behavior of policyholders. [Key words: deductibles, claims, auto
insurance]

INTRODUCTION

I

n the insurance economics literature, Venezia and Levy (1980) analyze
the anecdotally familiar but poorly understood characteristic of the
claims filing decision where a policyholder chooses not to report an other‐
wise covered loss because of the future uncertainties the reporting of the
claim creates. They recognize that an individual’s optimal insurance claim‐
ing strategy is determined by a balance between the benefits of indemnifi‐
cation for loss and the additional costs of paying higher future insurance
premiums resulting from the bonus‐malus pricing system that exists in the
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private insurance market. In this context, the loss suffered must exceed
some threshold value before an insurance claim will be pursued. Venezia
and Levy develop an economic model based on a multi‐period utility
function to determine the critical value that a loss must exceed in order for
a risk averse decision maker to file an insurance claim despite the related
future premium increase.2 Their theoretical model suggests that the critical
threshold loss value defining an individual’s optimal claims strategy will
decrease with age and increase as risk increases and as a decision maker’s
discount factor increases.
Venezia (1984) modifies Venezia and Levy (1980) by specifically con‐
sidering the optimal auto insurance claims strategy given the selection of
a deductible by a risk averse driver. The author finds that age does not
necessarily influence the critical threshold loss value defining when an
insurance claim is (not) filed when the simultaneity of the deductible and
claims filing decisions is modeled. Interestingly, Venezia shows how theo‐
retically a claim will be filed notsimply when a given loss amount exceeds
the stated deductible, but only when the loss amount is larger than the
deductible by some critical amount that accounts for the larger future
premium associated with filing a claim for the loss.
Unfortunately, there has been little empirical research conducted to
support the theoretical models of Venezia and Levy (1980) and Venezia
(1984). A particular problem in researching this behavioral aspect of insur‐
ance claims reporting is the dearth of information concerning policyholder
losses that occur but for which no insurance claim is ever made. Insurance
companies and researchers relying on only the observable elements in
closed claims data, for example, are not privy to complete information
about the insurance claims decision process. Depending on the nature and
design of the study, this lack of information about the full spectrum of
losses, both reported and unreported, can create a bias.
Braun, Fader, Bradlow, and Kunreuther (2006) study this claims filing
behavior by investigating the pseudodeductible, the term they coin to
describe the unstated (and unobservable) threshold amount below which
a policyholder may choose to not file an insurance claim despite the fact
that the loss amount exceeds any stated deductible in the policy. They use
the pseudodeductible concept to explain the curious policyholder decision
to “leave money on the table” by not reporting an otherwise covered loss
as an insurance claim due to reasons such as the fear of a future premium
increase or the loss of coverage. Braun, et al. believe their research on this
2

Venezia and Levy (1980) do not specifically account for deductibles. As they state, “For ease
of exposition we assume that claims are met without deductions” (p. 547).
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topic to be the first to attempt to empirically study the behavior prompted
by the pseudodeductible.
There are numerous empirical studies that investigate many other
aspects of the insurance claims filing decision, but none besides Braun, et
al. (2006) have considered the presence of a pseudodeductible and many
suffer from the lack of information concerning losses never reported as
insurance claims. This information is rarely captured explicitly in the data.
For example, much of the prior research studying the insurance claims
filing decision by policyholders depends upon proxies to estimate claims
filing rates or propensities to file claims.3 One notable exception is Biddle
and Roberts (2003), in which the authors use data about workplace injuries
both reported and not reported as workers’ compensation claims. How‐
ever, the authors do not attempt to isolate the effects of any pseudo‐
deductible in the claims reporting decision.
This paper adds to our understanding of insurance pseudodeductibles
by empirically examining the decisions made by insurance consumers to
forgo reporting losses for reasons that may indicate the presence of
pseudodeductibles. The unique opportunity to analyze a dataset that
allows us to observe policyholders who have suffered covered losses and
yet who have chosen not to file insurance claims is strong motivation for
this study. It is an attempt to better understand the extent to which
behavioral and psychological factors influence the insurance claims filing
process.
The next section of this paper reviews the prior literature concerning
behavioral theories that explain the individual decision‐making process.
A more detailed summary of the pseudodeductible identified by Braun, et
al. (2006) and a discussion of how the present paper adds to the Braun, et
al. study are then provided. The data used to empirically test the selectivity
of policyholders as indicated by their claims filing decisions with respect
to a pseudodeductible are described next. The research hypothesis will
then be stated and the regression model used will be specified in greater
detail. The last two sections will explain the empirical results and offer
concluding remarks.
3

Two such examples are Butler and Worrall (1983) and Cummins and Tennyson (1996).
Butler and Worrall model workers’ compensation claims filing rates by looking at the num‐
ber of injury claims filed as a percentage of the number (in thousands) of employees, not as
a percentage of the number who have actually experienced a workplace accident. Cummins
and Tennyson model the likelihood of filing a third‐party bodily injury auto claim by divid‐
ing the number of these reported claims by the number of third‐party property damage
claims, with the latter representing the complete pool of possible bodily injury claims that
could have been reported. There is possible measurement error using this proxy in that
some of the property damage claimants likely did not suffer bodily injuries.
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Review of Individual Decision-Making Literature
With respect to insurance consumers making choices that are prima
facie economically irrational, Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther
(1993) attribute such decision error to possible distortions in how a policy‐
holder evaluates the risk itself, the policy premium, or the benefit paid from
the policy. For example, framing can affect the way benefits from an
insurance contract are perceived. This will result from what Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) call loss aversion, where the negative consequences from a
loss are perceived to be greater than the positive consequences associated
with a gain of the same size. When alternative decision options are com‐
pared against a status quo or default option, the potential losses associated
with choosing an alternative different from the status quo may be more
heavily weighted in the decision process than the possible gain of making
the alternative choice. The result is a specific type of status quo bias that
Thaler (1980) calls the endowment effect.4
The term status quo bias was first introduced by Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988), who describe it is a more general classification of the
decision biases that are related to but not dependent upon loss aversion,
framing, and the endowment effect described above. They suggest that
preference for the status quo may be economically rational to the extent
there are direct and indirect transaction costs, which they refer to as
transition costs, or if there is a measure of uncertainty in the alternative
decision choices. Besides the presence of transaction costs that might
discourage insurance claiming, policyholders face a new uncertainty with
respect to the claims filing decision. What will be the future impact associ‐
ated with reporting the loss to the insurance company? The post‐loss status
quo is the insurance policy yet to be affected by the loss. The greater the
uncertainty surrounding this potential impact the more likely the policy‐
holder will maintain the status quo by choosing not to report the loss as an
insurance claim.
Saumuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) also describe how regret avoid‐
ance creates a status quo bias, and it is conceivable that minimizing future
regret affects claims filing behavior as well. Kahneman and Tversky (1982)
believe that individuals suffer greater regret for the negative consequences
of actions taken than the regret they feel for similar negative consequences
resulting from no action at all (as cited in Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
4

Thaler’s (1980) endowment effect describes an individual decision maker who tends to
misperceive the gains and losses associated with an alternative choice relative to the status
quo. The potential losses associated with an alternative choice will tend to be overestimated
and decision makers will therefore be more likely to maintain the status quo scenario.
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In the claims filing decision context one can imagine a policyholder,
uncertain about the impact on future insurance premiums from reporting
a loss, being more inclined not to file the insurance claim (i.e., maintaining
the status quo) because of regretting the fallout from the filing decision
more than regretting the out‐of‐pocket loss associated with decision not to
file the claim.
Prior research on the subject of individuals giving up otherwise avail‐
able pecuniary benefits spans several different disciplines other than insur‐
ance. The concept of rebate proneness in the marketing field has similarities
to the choice by policyholders to file an insurance claim. In finance, there
is the question concerning employee enrollment in private pension
schemes, especially the failure of some to participate at a level that achieves
an employer‐matched contribution on behalf of individual employees. To
a somewhat lesser extent, there is the issue of take‐up rates for government‐
sponsored insurance and welfare programs.
From a marketing perspective, consumers who purchase products
accompanied by rebate offers may choose not to complete the rebate
redemption process. Silk (2004) suggests that such “breakage” results from
psychological characteristics of consumers, such as procrastination and
underestimation of the effort involved in redeeming the rebates (as cited
in McCall, Bruneau, Ellis, and Mian, 2009). McCall, Eckrich, and Bruneau
(2007) research the idea of consumptive delay as an explanation for not
claiming rebate benefits, where some consumers are more inclined to be
attracted to products with rebates because they have relatively greater
willpower with respect to accepting the delayed rebate payoff (as cited in
McCall, et al, 2009). As described in McCall, et al. (2009), the burden of
completing the rebate redemption process, including requirements to
complete forms, provide written receipts, and remove proof of purchase
labels, provides rebate program disincentives (see Tat, Cunningham, and
Babakus, 1988). While perceptions of products using rebates and percep‐
tions of the rebates themselves are investigated in the marketing literature,
one of the few efforts to understand the demographic profile of consumers
most likely to purchase products promoted by rebate offers found that age
and sex were not significant factors (McCall, et al., 2009).
The finance literature investigates situations when employees forgo
an employer’s matching retirement contribution as a result of their indi‐
vidual choices either not to participate in the employer‐sponsored retire‐
ment plan or to participate at such low contribution levels that they fail to
maximize the employer’s contribution. Madrian and Shea (2001) provide
a thorough discussion of many of the same behavioral economic theories
described above that might explain this phenomenon. For example,
employee procrastination in making changes to default choices results in
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the status quo bias defined by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The direct
and indirect transaction costs of voluntarily participating or initiating
changes to default 401(k) choices contributes to this procrastination.5
Madrian and Shea also suggest the presence of an endowment effect and
anchoring that can lead to a status quo bias resulting in the observed
employee savings behavior.
Forgoing welfare or social insurance benefits to which a person is
otherwise entitled is a similar choice as forgoing private insurance indem‐
nification for a loss. Andrade (2002) reviews the primary empirical studies
concerning low take‐up rates in means‐tested welfare programs. He
describes how all direct and indirect costs associated with the choice to
participate in welfare programs can be viewed as sources of disutility. In a
rational, utility‐maximizing decision model the net utility of claiming
welfare benefits, which includes both the utility and disutility of doing so,
is compared to the utility of not claiming the benefits. As the disutility
associated with take‐up increases due to increasing transaction or psycho‐
logical costs, it becomes more likely that the net utility from claiming will
be less than the utility from not claiming. Based on the empirical evidence,
Andrade concludes that low take‐up rates are due to psychological costs
such as the stigma associated with collecting welfare (see also Moffitt,
1983).
Hernandez, Pudney, and Hancock (2007) estimate the implicit value
of the disutility arising from transaction or psychological costs resulting in
an individual’s decision against collecting government‐provided pension
benefits in the United Kingdom. In estimating the overall costs to claiming
welfare benefits, they find that income per head of household, education,
the presence of disability benefits, and home ownership are significantly
related to high overall costs of claiming, resulting in a lower propensity of
benefit take‐up.
Non‐means‐tested social insurance programs should not have the
same level of stigma as means‐tested welfare programs. However, take‐up
rates are still less than 100 percent. Ebenstein and Stange (2010) investigate
low take‐up rates in the non‐means‐tested unemployment insurance pro‐
grams in the United States. Generally, their findings suggest that reducing
barriers within the claims process will not necessarily affect program
participation.
5

Madrian and Shea (2001) include as indirect costs the costs of gathering and evaluating
information about 401(k) plan design and features and multiple investment options and
contribution levels.
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The Pseudodeductible
In response to the shortcomings of studying policyholder claims filing
behavior without information about losses that simply went unreported,
Braun, et al. (2006) use Bayesian inference to better understand how
insured yet unreported losses might generate different conclusions than
what would be reached by looking only at the observable data. Applying
their model to the observable information in homeowner’s claims data
provided by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, their findings suggest
that policyholders who suffer frequent losses may actually be more selec‐
tive about which claims they report than policyholders who experience
fewer losses.
The State Farm data used by Braun, et al. (2006) contain information
about households with homeowner’s insurance, including deductible
levels and claims activity. Whether a household filed any claims during the
1998 to 2003 research period can be directly observed, but the losses never
reported as claims remain unobservable. Therefore, no distinction can be
made between households that never suffered a loss and therefore never
filed a claim and households who suffered a loss but simply chose not to
report it. There is also no way to directly observe whether the reported
claims represent all losses that a given household has suffered. The authors
rely on Bayesian probability models and the observable data to make
inferences about these unknowns.
Braun, et al. (2006) were interested in better understanding why it was
observed in the data that nearly a fifth of the households in their sample
filed at least one small claim during the research period. Using their
Bayesian models, they look at the percentage of households filing at least
one “small” claim and find that accounting for the pseudodeductible
significantly enhances the ability of their predictive model to replicate the
observed likelihood of households filing small claims. This supports their
contention that the pseudodeductible and the propensity to file small
claims are closely related.
Braun, et al. (2006) also infer from their model that the riskiness of a
given household, in terms of likelihood of reporting or filing an insurance
claim, may be driven by the size of reported claims in addition to simply
looking at the number of claims filed. Relying on observed frequencies
alone may not tell the whole story. For example, their research suggests
that policyholders who have filed relatively small claims in the past may
be exhibiting less selectivity in their claims reporting behavior than poli‐
cyholders who have filed the same number of claims but of greater sever‐
ities. Despite the fact that policyholders who have filed small claims may
be, in the words of Braun, et al., less risk‐prone, they may have a greater
propensity to file. Those who have filed larger claims may be less likely to
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file and may have more unclaimed losses, thereby exhibiting a larger
pseudodeductible and a more selective nature than those who filed smaller
claims.
The Braun, et al. (2006) study demonstrates the nonstationarity of the
pseudodeductible as well. Their results suggest that increasing severities
of reported claims within households may be due to an increasing
pseudodeductible and a greater selectivity in the claims reporting decision.
The authors posit that policyholder fears of future premium increases
resulting from previously reported claims might lead them to absorb
increasingly larger loss amounts. In essence, having filed a prior claim
makes the filing of future claims less likely. Therefore, the recent claim‐filer
may be a good risk to insure, given that they will be less likely to file future
claims (i.e., they will be more selective about which claim to file or report
in the future).
The research described in the following sections of this paper furthers
our understanding of pseudodeductibles. It improves upon Braun, et al.
(2006) in the sense that it utilizes data that capture both claimed and
unclaimed losses. The unclaimed losses were unobservable in Braun, et al.
It also complements the Braun, et al study by analyzing pseudodeductibles
in an auto insurance context. Braun, et al studied homeowner’s insurance
claims data.

Description of the Data
The primary source of data for this research is from a survey conducted
by the Insurance Research Council (Insurance Research Council, 1999),
hereafter referred to as the IRC. The survey participants were selected as
the result of their responses to an initial random nationwide mailing in
which it was indicated that someone in that household had been injured
in at least one auto accident during the period between calendar years 1995
and 1998. The term “injured” refers to the bodily injuries of household
members and does not include information about physical damage to
property or the extent to which a household member injured a third party.
These data include some demographic information about each injured
household member, detailed information concerning the injuries suffered
and how those injuries were medically treated, and information about
various sources of compensation for the financial loss associated with the
injuries. Of particular interest here, respondents identify when, despite a
loss and the presence of auto insurance coverage, they elect not to file an
auto insurance claim for reasons indicative of the presence of a pseudode‐
ductible. A respondent could indicate one or more of the following reasons
for not filing an auto insurance claim:
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(1) My household member was at fault—couldn’t collect from other
driver.
(2) Other driver was uninsured.
(3) Other driver was relative/friend, didn’t want to make a claim against
him/her.
(4) No other car was involved.
(5) Amount involved was small, not worth the bother.
(6) Expenses were covered by other benefit sources.
(7) Own car didn’t have injury coverage for its passengers.
(8) Could have collected from own auto insurer but didn’t want to raise
our rates.
(9) Other car hit and ran.
(10) Other reason.
Braun, et al. (2006) describe their concept of a pseudodeductible in
terms of a policyholder “leaving money on the table,” which is the decision
by the policyholder to forgo a loss indemnity payment because its value is
less than the policyholder’s expected utility derived from not filing the
insurance claim. From the list of reasons above, items 3, 5, and 8 are
consistent with that definition. The general idea behind this research is to
analyze the likelihood of those injured in auto accidents to file auto insur‐
ance claims relative to those deciding not to file claims because of a
pseudodeductible‐related reason. Those choosing not to file because of a
pseudodeductible are essentially indicating that the insurance indemnity
amount is less than the expected utility associated with not filing the claim.
To this end, the presence of at least one of these three reasons is required
when analyzing the non‐filers. Further, the non‐filers are limited to those
who did not indicate any other reason for not filing, in order to avoid the
possible bias created by other reasons dominating the pseudodeductible
reasons.
The survey instructions request that the questions be answered by the
household member most familiar with the accident and ask that detailed
answers to survey questions reflect only the most recent auto accident
during the period 1995–1998 if more than one auto accident has occurred.
Each survey respondent answers the same set of questions on behalf of a
maximum of three household members who have been injured in the same
auto accident. The complete set of data captures detailed information about
losses suffered by 5,768 individuals, some of whom do not report their
losses as insurance claims. This is what makes this dataset unique.
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The survey’s treatment of each of the 5,768 observations as separate
and independent despite the fact that some observations are household
members injured in the same auto accident might not present a problem
in terms of analyzing economic losses or types of injuries sustained. How‐
ever, given that this is a study about the claims filing decision process of
policyholders, this design may create a bias in the data. For example, if an
adult and one minor child were injured in an auto accident and the adult
responded to the survey questions for both injured household members,
two observations are created that contain information about the related
decision to file an insurance claim for each injury.
There is nothing in the data that explicitly links the individual obser‐
vations together by household. To address the potential bias created when
a single household member makes claims filing decisions on behalf of other
individual observations throughout the data, clusters of individuals
injured as part of the same households were manually created. The strategy
is to change the unit of observation from the individual to the household
level by collapsing the multiple observations of a single identified cluster
into one household‐level observation. To begin, all observations were
sorted according to the following variables: the type of accident that
occurred (a collision, a single‐vehicle accident, an accident involving a
pedestrian, or other), the month in which the accident occurred, the year
in which the accident occurred, the state and city where the accident
occurred, the location of the accident (in a central city, a suburb, a medium
city, a small town, or a rural environment), and how many household
members were injured in the accident.
There are 3,959 out of the original 5,768 observations in the original
dataset with only a single injured person where clustering is unnecessary.
Of the remaining 1,590 observations with multiple injured household
members indicated, 707 fairly obvious clusters of the observations were
identified that appeared to represent 707 separate households based on the
sort parameters.6 From the cluster identification process, the original data‐
set was reduced from 5,768 to 5,549 individual observations, with the 219
missing observations resulting from multiple‐injured responses that did
not include enough information for clustering purposes.
6
The 1,590 observations subject to clustering can be broken down as follows: 1,142 indicated
having two injured household members; 319 had three injured household members; 98 had
four injured household members; 20 had five injured household members; 8 had six injured
household members; and 3 had seven injured household members.
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The claims filing decision for each family member within an identified
cluster was reviewed. There were no clusters in which some members filed
an insurance claim and others did not, but there were situations where the
reasons given for not filing an auto claim were inconsistent within a given
cluster. Of particular importance to this study are the instances where an
injured household member did not indicate at least one pseudodeductible‐
related reason for not reporting a loss. Collapsing these clusters into one
household decision‐making entity would be difficult and so these clusters
were removed from the dataset resulting in the elimination of 17 clusters,
or a total of 42 individual observations.
The dependent variable used in the model described later identifies
those households that have chosen not to report an otherwise covered loss
as an auto insurance claim specifically because of at least one pseudo‐
deductible‐related reason (i.e., fear of rate increase, friend or family was
the other driver, or the loss was too small to bother). There were 424
observations removed from the analysis because the reason indicated for
not filing an auto insurance claim did not include one of these specific
reasons. To avoid the potential bias created by the presence of other reasons
in addition to any of the pseudodeductible reasons for not reporting an
insurance claim, the dependent variable was further limited to those obser‐
vations identifying only one or more of the pseudodeductible reasons and
no others. This removes another 90 observations from the analysis.
The original idea of a pseudodeductible relates primarily to first‐party
insurance. Although the same concerns giving rise to the pseudodeductible
(e.g., fears of premium increases or non‐renewals of coverage) can appear
in the decision to report third‐party liability claims, there is much more at
stake if a third‐party loss goes unreported. It is likely, given the possibility
of attorneys’ fees, non‐economic damage awards, and punitive damage
awards, that the costs associated with choosing not to report a third‐party
loss far exceed the costs related to either premium increases or coverage
terminations, or both. Similar to Braun, et al. (2006), who analyze the
pseudodeductible within a first‐party (homeowner’s property) insurance
context, the focus of this study is first‐party auto insurance.
The survey captures information about bodily injuries resulting from
multi‐vehicle collisions, single‐vehicle accidents, and pedestrian accidents.
There is no information about physical damage to autos. All of these
accident scenarios are included in this research because first‐party insur‐
ance benefits for bodily injuries existing under Personal Injury Protection
(PIP), Medical Payments (MedPay) coverage, or Uninsured/Underinsured
Motorists (UM/UIM) coverage can respond under any of these types of
accidents. However, to draw direct comparisons between the likelihood
of reporting a first‐party loss relative to the likelihood of not reporting a
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first‐party loss, observations in which an insurance claim is filed against
a third‐party’s auto insurer, either by itself or in conjunction with a first‐
party claim, are removed. This limitation to a first‐party insurance com‐
parison further reduces the number of observations from 4,993 to 2,112.
The idea of a policyholder forgoing insurance indemnity as a result of a
pseudodeductible due to a relatively larger expected utility value implies
that there is otherwise insurance coverage available for a loss. Observations
that indicated no auto insurance coverage existed (N = 4) were therefore
removed as well.
Each household member from an identified cluster that was injured
and listed as a separate observation was given the same identification
number. The clusters were collapsed into the observation for the oldest
household member within a given cluster. This means that the multiple‐
injury households take on the demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gen‐
der) of their oldest members. The economic losses reported for the oldest
household member was replaced by the sum of the economic losses
reported by all other members of a given cluster, in essence becoming a
total household economic loss value. This process of collapsing each iden‐
tified cluster into one single household observation further reduced the
dataset from 2,112 to 1,273 observations.
As previously noted, of particular interest here is the response to the
survey question indicating one or more pseudodeductible‐related reasons,
but no others, for choosing not to file a first‐party auto insurance claim for
an otherwise covered loss. There were 20 non‐filers that satisfy this require‐
ment. How the three pseudodeductible‐related reasons are combined
across the remaining 20 non‐filers is summarized in Table 1. In short, there
were no respondents indicating “Other driver was friend/relative” as a
reason for not filing a claim. Of the remaining two pseudodeductible
reasons, only one respondent indicated both the “Fear of premium
increase” and the “Minor accident only” reasons together. All other non‐
filers reported either of these two pseudodeductible reasons exclusively.
The primary advantage of using the data described above is that they
allow for a unique analysis of the reasons why a policyholder with an
otherwise covered loss would choose not to file an insurance claim. Despite
this benefit, however, there are limitations to the dataset. Only bodily injury
losses are identified, which could bias the empirical results assuming that
some policyholders’ decisions are also influenced by the presence of first‐
party physical damage losses.7 There is very little personal demographic
information available for each household, such as income, wealth, and
7

Survey respondents may have also suffered first‐party physical damage losses in addition
to bodily injury, but that information is simply not captured by the IRC survey instrument.
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Table 1. Breakdown of Pseudodeductible Reasons Indicated for Choosing
Not to File a First‐Party Bodily Injury Auto Insurance Claim
% of all
non‐filers
identifying
particular
pseudodeduct‐
ible reason
(N=20)

When “Minor
accident only”
reason given
(N=14)

When “Other
driver was
friend/relative”
reason given
(N=0)

When “Fear of
premium
increase”
reason given
(N=7)

70.0%

100.0%

0.0%

14.3%

Other driver was
friend/relative

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Fear of premium
increase

35.0

7.1

0.0

100.0

Pseudodeduct‐
ible reasons for
not filing
Minor accident
only

Note: Data represent the percentages of each sample indicating the stated reason for not
filing. Because multiple responses were permitted, column sums may exceed 100%.

occupation and there is no insurance policy information such as policy
limits, deductibles, and type of coverage that applies (e.g., UM/UIM, PIP,
or Medical Payments).

Research Hypothesis and Methodology
The research hypothesis for this study can be developed from the
inferences and conclusions in the Braun, et al. (2006) paper. Their findings
suggest that policyholders who have higher claims filing rates also have
higher percentage differences between the amounts of the stated policy
deductibles and their pseudodeductibles. Conversely, those with lower
filing rates have smaller percentage differences. The general implication is
that those who have filed more insurance claims in the past will have
relatively higher pseudodeductibles and will be more selective about
reporting future losses as insurance claims. Their Bayesian models also
suggest that those with smaller losses may be more likely to report small
claims and those with larger losses may be more likely to absorb the losses.
Given these earlier findings, the alternative hypothesis tested in this paper
can be stated as follows:
Ha:

A household with a history of previous claims and a relatively more severe
loss will be less likely to file an auto insurance claim due to a pseudo‐
deductible.
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A logistic regression model is used to test this hypothesis. The depen‐
dent variable (FILECLAIM) is a binary response equal to one if the house‐
hold loss was reported as an insurance claim with the respondent’s own
auto insurer. The variable is equal to zero if at least one of the pseudo‐
deductible‐related reasons for not reporting a loss as an auto insurance
claim (i.e., the loss was too minor and/or there was a fear of a future
premium increase) is indicated. The model identifies factors that affect the
propensity to file a first‐party insurance claim for bodily injuries relative
to not filing because of the presence of a pseudodeductible.

Explanatory Variables
In this study, loss severity is measured by the natural log transforma‐
tion of total economic damages incurred (LNECONLOSS). Previous stud‐
ies have found that the severity of the loss incurred by the policyholder has
a bearing on the claims reporting decision. This has been empirically
supported in the workers’ compensation context (see Biddle and Roberts,
2003) and from a third‐party moral hazard perspective (see Cummins and
Tennyson, 1996), with both studies suggesting that greater losses increase
the likelihood of filing insurance claims. However, Braun, et al. (2006) find
that because of the presence of a pseudodeductible the likelihood of filing
an insurance claim may decrease as the size of the loss increases. The sign
of the estimated coefficient on this variable is therefore uncertain.
An important result of the Braun, et al. (2006) study is the finding that
a more active claims‐filing history may result in a lower propensity to file
future claims. The IRC data do not explicitly indicate the reporting of
previous insurance claims, but they do include the number of auto acci‐
dents that have occurred during the three‐year period leading up to the
present loss to which the survey questions apply. Dummy variables are
used to measure previous auto insurance claiming activity. ONEPRIO‐
RACC equals one when there has been just one accident previous to the
accident being reported upon and zero when there have been no previous
accidents. MULTPRIORACC equals one when at least two prior accidents
have occurred and zero otherwise. The category of no previous accidents
(NOPRIORACC) is the holdout scenario in the regression analysis. It is
anticipated that as the number of previous accidents increases relative to
no prior accidents the likelihood of reporting the current accident as an
auto claim decreases. This would support the findings in Braun, et al.
A dummy variable (FEMALE) identifying the gender of the injured
respondent equals one if a female was injured and zero otherwise. There
are also three age dummy variables indicating when the injured person is
under age 25 (AGE25), between the ages of 25 and 55 (AGE2555), or age 55
or older (AGE55). These variables may be important factors to the extent

58

DANA A. KERR

that they alter the degree of relative risk aversion (Halek and Eisenhauer,
2001). As an individual becomes relatively more risk averse, there may be
an increased willingness to forgo filing an insurance claim if it creates
uncertainty that leads to a pseudodeductible, such as a fear of future
premium increases. On the other hand, the decision not to report a loss,
especially one involving bodily injuries where the precise loss values are
difficult to initially predict, could create uncertainty that would discourage
the more risk averse from being influenced by a pseudodeductible. In
either case, the arguments, and therefore the value of these particular
variables, only hold when the person making the decision to report a loss
as an insurance claim is the same as the person injured in the accident. As
described earlier in the paper, the dataset is designed so that one household
member makes the claims filing decision for multiple household members.
Recall that to remove the potential data bias this creates, the multiple‐injury
households (of which there were 1,590 out of the original 5,768 observa‐
tions) were clustered into common households and each clustered house‐
hold was collapsed into an individual household observation of the oldest
household member. To control somewhat for the effect this clustering and
collapsing process may have on the regression results, a dummy variable
is included (MULTINJ) that is equal to one when the observation is a
combined household version of previously individual observations and
zero otherwise.
Soft tissue injuries are relatively more susceptible to moral hazard than
other types of injuries because they are difficult to objectively diagnose and
treat (Dionne and St‐Michel, 1991; Weisberg and Derrig, 1991; Cummins
and Tennyson, 1996; and Derrig, Weisberg, and Chen, 1994). Cummins and
Tennyson (1996) argue that soft tissue injuries reduce claims filing costs for
fraudulent claims thereby increasing the number of claims filed for such
injuries. To control more generally for the claims‐filing incentives created
by the treatment of relatively subjective injuries, a dummy variable
(ALTTX) is included that equals one if the respondent’s injuries were
treated by a chiropractor, some other type of alternative care provider, or
a psychologist, and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient is expected.
Control dummy variables indicating the states in which the accidents
took place are included in the model. These binary variables, identified by
each state’s postal abbreviation, capture both observable and unobservable
cross‐sectional differences created by differences among the states that
might influence pseudodeductibles and more generally policyholder
claims‐filing behavior.8 Massachusetts is the holdout state.
Dummy variables are also included indicating when the auto law
in a given accident state is tort liability (TORT), no‐fault with a mone‐
tary threshold (MONETARYNF), no‐fault with a verbal threshold
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(VERBALNF), choice no‐fault (CHOICENF), or add‐on no‐fault
(ADDONNF). Drivers in choice no‐fault states can choose at the time
insurance is purchased to be covered by either tort or no‐fault rules with
the no‐fault option carrying with it the usual tort restrictions.9 The add‐on
laws are separately identified because the no‐fault options do not place
restrictions on the ability to file tort claims. The holdout group in the
regression models is the tort law category. Even in tort liability states where
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage is not necessary, limited first‐
party benefits for bodily injuries in personal auto policies exist under
Medical Payments coverage. However, given the emphasis on first‐party
PIP coverage in no‐fault states, there may be a stronger effect on the first‐
party claims decision in no‐fault states compared to tort states.
The data collected cover the period 1995 through 1998. Control
dummy variables for each accident year are included, with the holdout
year being 1998.
Of the 1,273 observations remaining from the original dataset after
limiting the data to first‐party auto claims and collapsing the individual
claimant observations into household observations, a total of 1,100 obser‐
vations are used in the final analysis. The difference is the result of missing
data for particular variables, the removal of other observations that pre‐
sented conflicting survey information, and removal of particular data
points causing computational problems. Variables with missing data
include the following: the gender of the household decision maker (N =
14); various accident year identifiers (N = 17); the number of previous
accidents (N = 3); the age of the head of household (N = 16), and various
state identifiers (N = 13). Accuracy checks on the survey responses showed
93 observations where the respondents collected payments from their own
8
The IRC data identify the states where accidents occurred and not necessarily the states of
residency. While much of the variation created by the different states is the result of the acci‐
dent location, some of the variation may also be attributable to differences among the states
of residency. It is possible that an accident occurs in a different state than the residency state,
but much of that variation should still be captured because in a large majority of the cases
the states are the same. An early investigation of auto accident locations relative to victims’
areas of residence (see Durand, 1980) found that nearly 51% of injured auto accident victims
were involved in accidents within five miles of their homes and almost 71% were injured
within a ten‐mile radius. Only about 10% of injured people were involved in accidents more
than thirty miles from their homes.
9
The three choice no‐fault states are Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Owings‐
Edwards (2004) suggested that Kentucky and New Jersey should be considered de facto no‐
fault states in any empirical work because roughly 90 percent of the drivers in each state
elect the no‐fault option. Therefore, Kentucky and New Jersey are categorized as monetary
and verbal threshold no‐fault states, respectively, leaving Pennsylvania as the only choice
no‐fault state.
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auto insurers while at the same time indicating that no claims were filed
with their own auto insurers (and vice versa). Also, 15 observations indi‐
cated collecting from other benefit sources (such as workers’ compensa‐
tion, group health insurance, or others) and they did not report a bodily
injury claim to their own auto insurers. These observations were removed
to avoid any potential bias created by the possibility that these respondents
did not pursue a first‐party auto insurance claim because of the other
benefit sources and simply did not indicate that as a reason for not filing
the claim. Finally, two observations, one each from Alaska and Washington
DC, caused convergence problems with the logistic regression model and
were therefore removed. Summary statistics for all variables appearing in
the empirical model are presented in Table 2 with the exception of the states
in which the accidents occurred, which can be found summarized in Table
A‐1 of the Appendix.

Research Model
This research evaluates the propensity to file a first‐party auto insur‐
ance claim relative to not filing such a claim because of a pseudodeductible.
When an otherwise covered claim is not filed due to a pseudodeductible,
it identifies a case where a policyholder is willing to give up the indemnity
payment because its value does not exceed the policyholder’s expected
utility associated with not filing the claim. Because the dependent variable
in this model has a 0/1 binary outcome, a logistic regression model relying
on the maximum likelihood estimation process is used (Greene, 1997). The
probability of filing an insurance claim is modeled using the following
equation:
p
logit(p) = ln ⎛⎝ ------------⎞⎠ = β0 + β1 LNECONLOSS + β2ONEPRIORACC
1–p
+ β3MULTPRIORACC + β4LARGE + β5FEMALE

+ β6AGE25 + β7AGE55 + β8MULTINJ + β9ALTTX
+ β10MONETARYNF + β11VERBALNF + β12CHOICENF
+ β13ADDONNF + β141995 +β151996 + β161997
63

+

∑

βi ACCIDENTSTATE

i = 17

where p is the probability that a first‐party auto insurance claim is filed and
1 – p is the probability that no insurance claim is filed due to the presence
of a pseudodeductible.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis (N = 1,100)a
Variable

Definition of variable

Mean

FILECLAIM

Binary dependent variable equal to 1 if first‐party auto
claim filed and 0 if claim not filed due to pseudodeduct‐
ible.

0.98
(0.13)

LNECONLOSS

Natural log of total economic loss in each household
involved in auto accident.

7.63
(1.84)

ONEPRIORACC

Dummy variable indicating previous auto accidents
equal to 1 when one previous accident and 0 otherwise.

0.08
(0.27)

MULTPRIORACC

Dummy variable indicating previous auto accidents
equal to 1 when at least two previous accidents and 0
otherwise.

0.02
(0.12)

LARGE

Dummy variable indicating size threshold of loss equal
to 1 when economic loss greater than or equal to $1,000
and 0 otherwise.

0.67
(0.47)

FEMALE

Dummy variable equal to 1 when gender of oldest
injured household member and presumed decision
maker is female and 0 otherwise.

0.61
(0.49)

AGE25

Dummy variable equal to 1 when age of oldest injured
household member and presumed decision maker is
under 25 and 0 otherwise.

0.22
(0.42)

AGE55

Dummy variable equal to 1 when age of oldest injured
household member and presumed decision maker is at
or over 55 and 0 otherwise.

0.19
(0.39)

MULTINJ

Dummy variable equal to 1 when household had more
than one injured member and 0 otherwise.

0.15
(0.36)

ALTTX

Dummy variable equal to 1 if medical treatment
involved chiropractor, other alternative treatment, or
psychologist and 0 otherwise.

0.31
(0.46)

MONETARYNF

Dummy variable equal to 1 when monetary threshold
no‐fault state and 0 otherwise.

0.09
(0.29)

VERBALNF

Dummy variable equal to 1 when verbal threshold no‐
fault state and 0 otherwise.

0.18
(0.39)

CHOICENF

Dummy variable equal to 1 when choice no‐fault state
and 0 otherwise.

0.13
(0.33)

ADDONNF

Dummy variable equal to 1 when add‐on no‐fault state
and 0 otherwise.

0.17
(0.38)

Table continues
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Table 2. continued
Variable

Definition of variable

Mean

1995

Dummy variable equal to 1 when accident year is 1995
and 0 otherwise.

0.26
(0.44)

1996

Dummy variable equal to 1 when accident year is 1996
and 0 otherwise.

0.30
(0.46)

1997

Dummy variable equal to 1 when accident year is 1997
and 0 otherwise.

0.40
(0.49)

a

Dummy variables for the different states in which accidents occurred are summarized in
Table A‐1 of the Appendix.
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Minimums and maximums for all dummy
variables are, by definition, 0 and 1 respectively. The minimum and maximum values for
LNECONLOSS are 1.10 and 13.57, respectively. For all discrete variables, the mean value
reflects percentage of total number of observations.

In the sample of closed claims data used by Braun, et al. (2006), 18
percent had filed at least one claim of less than $1,000. The authors perform
a posterior predictive check of their Bayesian probability models for the
percentage of households with at least one reported insurance claim less
than threshold values of $100, $250, $500, or $1,000. For the binary logistic
regression model used in this paper, a dummy variable (LARGE) is created
that equals one when the economic loss is greater than or equal to a $1,000
claim threshold and zero otherwise. Based upon the findings of Braun, et
al., a significant and negative coefficient estimate is expected. This would
support the contention that policyholders with large losses are more selec‐
tive in the claims they file when pseudodeductibles exist.

Empirical Results
The results of the logistic regression of FILECLAIM on all independent
variables are reported in Table 3. The adjusted R‐square for the model is
nearly 62 percent and the Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) statistic indicates
the model is a good fit with the data.
As the magnitude of the total economic loss increases, households do
not appear to be more selective in the claims filing decision, as is suggested
by Braun, et al. (2006). As households sustain higher economic losses they
become more likely to file auto claims than to forgo the claims because of
a pseudodeductible. This suggests that increasing loss amounts tend to
dominate potential pseudodeductible issues such as future premium
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increases, making it less likely that policyholders will decide to forgo
insurance indemnity payments.
Braun, et al. (2006) indicate that as the previous number of claims
increases, policyholders may become more selective in the claims they file
and more likely to forgo available indemnity payments. The results
reported here suggest that policyholders with one previous loss are signif‐
icantly more likely to report the current loss as an insurance claim com‐
pared to those who have had no previous losses. The way the dependent
variable is defined, this result also implies that policyholders with one
previous loss are less likely to assert that the presence of a pseudodeduct‐
ible affected their claims filing decision. This, alone, seems to contradict
Braun, et al.
There is no statistical difference between households with no prior
accidents and households with two or more prior accidents in terms of the
propensity to be influenced by a pseudodeductible. Although not reported
in Table 3, a simple change to the model was made to draw a direct
comparison between households with only one prior accident and house‐
holds with two or more prior accidents. The results provide some evidence
that households with no previous accidents and households with multiple
previous accidents are both more likely to be influenced by pseudodeduct‐
ibles compared to households with exactly one prior accident.10 This may
be indicative of policyholders initially experiencing a status quo bias but
then changing their behaviors as losses accumulate. With no previous
accidents, policyholders are reluctant to report the present loss as an
insurance claim because of the uncertain future pseudodeductible‐related
implications of such a decision. Having retained the financial impact of one
loss already, those who suffer a second loss (i.e., one accident prior to the
present one) are more inclined to report the second loss. For those who are
unfortunate enough to have had two or more previous accidents, their
claims filing behavior may again become more selective because of
updated information about the psuedodeductible‐related effects of previ‐
ously reported losses. This is consistent with the more general finding in
Braun, et al. (2006) that policyholders with more extensive claims histories
may be paradoxically more appealing as insurance customers because their
future claims filing behavior becomes more selective.
The dummy variable indicating total economic losses exceeding the
$1,000 large‐claim threshold is statistically significant, with the expected
10
The holdout category was changed from the no prior accident households (NOPRIOR‐
ACC) to households with two or more prior accidents (MULTPRIORACC). The estimated
coefficient on ONEPRIORACC is positive relative to the new holdout category and is signif‐
icant at the 10% level. The other empirical results reported in Table 3 remained unchanged.
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sign. Consistent with Braun, et al. (2006), households with “large” losses
are less likely to report a claim because of a pseudodeductible. Despite the
result that generally increasing economic loss values reduce the influence
of pseudodeductibles (per the LNECONLOSS coefficient estimate), it
appears that households are more concerned about the potential effect of
large loss amounts on the circumstances giving rise to pseudodeductibles,
such as future premium increases.
Gender appears to be a significant determinant in the role that
pseudodeductibles play in auto claims filing decisions, with females being
less likely than males to file claims and therefore more likely to be influ‐
enced by pseudodeductibles. Given that Halek and Eisenhauer (2001)
found evidence that female heads of households are relatively more risk
averse than males, females may perceive the uncertainty from reasons
creating pseudodeductibles, such as future premium increases, as being
greater than the uncertainty associated with the loss.
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) also found, in part, that the youngest and
oldest household heads are more risk averse relative to the middle‐aged.11
The results from this research indicate that those younger than 25 years are
no more or less likely to report a loss as an insurance claim than middle‐
aged policyholders between the ages of 25 and 55. However, those ages 55
and older are more likely to file an insurance claim without regard to a
pseudodeductible reason than those in the middle‐aged category. One
explanation for this mixed result may be that the oldest policyholders view
the risks from retaining the bodily injury loss as being significantly greater
than the risks leading to the development of a pseudodeductible. The
oldest policyholders may realize that their age can exacerbate the negative
financial consequences from a given bodily injury, and therefore less
concern is given to pseudodeductible‐related risks.
As expected, the design of a given accident state’s auto law signifi‐
cantly affects the decision to file first‐party bodily injury auto claims. In
particular, households across all no‐fault auto regimes were more likely to
file first‐party bodily injury auto claims relative to households in tort states.
With the exception of add‐on no‐fault states, all no‐fault laws were statis‐
tically significant at the conventional 5 percent level.
While including individual state dummy variables in the model is the
ideal method for controlling for many otherwise unobservable state‐spe‐
cific factors that could influence the claims reporting decision, there were
computational problems associated with including these dummy variables
in the model largely because (1) the model is a logistic regression model
11

More precisely, Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) found that the least risk averse heads of
households are 40 years old (p. 77).
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and (2) the number of non‐filer responses for the dependent variable
(where FILECLAIM = 0) is very sparse. There are many states in which all
of the responses equal one. This leads to what is known as a quasi‐complete
separation of the data, a failure of the maximum likelihood estimation
process to converge and therefore no maximum likelihood estimate for
many of the individual state variables. This is an indication that the logistic
regression model has come close to perfectly predicting the binary depen‐
dent variable.
Ironically, one way to resolve the quasi‐complete separation problem
present in logistic regressions applied to such data is to change the model
so it does not predict the response as perfectly. For example, the individual
state dummy variables could be collapsed into a small number of regional
variables for which there will be both zeros and ones appearing in each
broader category. This relatively simple approach, however, comes at the
expense of losing the ability to control for many state‐specific factors.
A more appealing approach to address the quasi‐complete separation
problem is a proposal by Firth (1993) to make certain changes to the
gradient vector such that the Newton‐Raphson numerical method for
maximizing the log‐likelihood function defining the logistic regression
model can be performed. Using the Firth method allows the maximum
likelihood estimation process to converge despite the presence of nearly
all individual state dummy variables in the model. The Firth method also
corrects for the bias created by the relative lack of variability in the binary
responses of the dependent variable (Allison, 2008).
A number of individual states influence the claiming decision in the
context of pseudodeductibles. Relative to the holdout state of Massachu‐
setts, the likelihood of policyholders reporting first‐party auto bodily
injury claims was statistically significant and greater in seventeen states
and significant and lower in three states.12 This suggests that a pseudo‐
deductible is more likely to influence the claims decision in Massachusetts
than in seventeen other states but is less likely to be a reason for choosing
not to report a loss in three other states. As reported by the Insurance
Information Institute, Massachusetts had the tenth highest overall average
expenditures for auto insurance in 1998 and was ranked as high as third in
1994 (Insurance Information Institute, 2001).13 This could partly explain the
12

Statistical significance is defined at the standard 5 percent level.
The overall average expenditure for auto insurance data is provided by the National Asso‐
ciation of Insurance Commissioners and represents what the average consumer actually
spends on insurance per vehicle. It does not specifically control for influential factors such
as types of coverages purchased, types of autos being insured, per capita income, number of
miles driven, and others.
13
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Results with Firth (1993) Bias Correction
(N=1,100)a
Description

Expected
sign

Estimated
coefficient

p‐value

LNECONLOSS

Natural log of economic loss

ONEPRIORACC

One previous accident in past
three years

+/–

1.1086

<0.0001

–

0.7369

0.0057

MULTPRIORACC

Two or more previous acci‐
dents in past three years

–

–0.0328

0.9441

LARGE

Economic loss greater than or
equal to $1,000

–

–0.3612

0.0303

Variable

FEMALE

Gender of accident victim

+/–

–0.2351

0.0432

AGE25

Age of accident victim is
under 25

+/–

0.0548

0.6429

AGE55

Age of accident victim is
greater than or equal to 55

+/–

1.7327

< 0.0001

MULTINJ

Multiple household mem‐
bers injured

+/–

0.1986

0.3010

ALTTX

Alternative treatment used
(chiropractor, alternative
treatment, or psychologist)

+

–0.1391

0.2827

MONETARYNF

Monetary threshold no‐fault
state

+

1.1073

0.0435

VERBALNF

Verbal threshold no‐fault
state

+

1.6551

0.0019

CHOICENF

Choice no‐fault state

+

2.0317

0.0003

ADDONNF

Add‐on no‐fault state

+/–

0.2678

0.7127

1995

1995 accident year

+/–

0.0348

0.8851

1996

1996 accident year

+/–

–0.1251

0.5960

1997

1997 accident year

+/–

–0.1649

0.4743

AL

Alabama

+/–

1.4159

0.0146

AR

Arkansas

+/–

0.9112

0.1770

AZ

Arizona

+/–

1.4752

0.0181

CA

California

+/–

2.1511

0.0001

CO

Colorado

+/–

0.7876

0.0921

CT

Connecticut

+/–

1.0034

0.1095

DE

Delaware

+/–

0.6012

0.4125

FL

Florida

+/–

–0.1769

0.5687

GA

Georgia

+/–

1.3731

0.0285

ID

Idaho

+/–

0.9076

0.1501

Table continues
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Table 3. continued
Variable

Description

Expected
sign

Estimated
coefficient

p‐value

IL

Illinois

+/–

1.7096

0.0020

IN

Indiana

+/–

0.9844

0.0742

IA

Iowa

+/–

1.5455

0.0137

KS

Kansas

+/–

0.7058

0.2415

KY

Kentucky

+/–

–0.3522

0.4485

LA

Louisiana

+/–

1.2279

0.0301

MD

Maryland

+/–

1.2082

0.0693

ME

Maine

+/–

–1.6075

0.0408

MI

Michigan

+/–

–0.5729

0.0300

MN

Minnesota

+/–

1.3016

0.0057

MO

Missouri

+/–

1.7950

0.0043

MS

Mississippi

+/–

0.1625

0.7691

MT

Montana

+/–

0.6230

0.3348

NC

North Carolina

+/–

2.8422

<0.0001

ND

North Dakota

+/–

0.2517

0.7007

NE

Nebraska

+/–

1.9893

0.0041

NH

New Hampshire

+/–

0.0000

No est.

NJ

New Jersey

+/–

–0.8919

0.0108

NM

New Mexico

+/–

2.9368

0.0002

NV

Nevada

+/–

0.0000

No est.

NY

New York

+/–

0.0000

No est.

OH

Ohio

+/–

1.4245

0.0089

OK

Oklahoma

+/–

1.0504

0.0648

OR

Oregon

+/–

1.9137

0.0053

PA

Pennsylvania

+/–

0.0000

No est.

RI

Rhode Island

+/–

0.6208

0.3950

SC

South Carolina

+/–

1.0899

0.0713

SD

South Dakota

+/–

–0.1706

0.8086

TN

Tennessee

+/–

1.4087

0.0194

TX

Texas

+/–

1.4486

0.0129

UT

Utah

+/–

0.1582

0.7286

VA

Virginia

+/–

0.8880

0.1376

VT

Vermont

+/–

1.3565

0.0732

WA

Washington

+/–

1.7764

0.0106

WI

Wisconsin

+/–

0.8431

0.2361

WV

West Virginia

+/–

1.2148

0.0666

Table continues
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Table 3. continued
Variable
WY

Description
Wyoming

Expected
sign

Estimated
coefficient

p‐value

+/–

0.8372

0.2157

Max‐rescaled R2 = 0.6253b
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness‐of‐Fit Chi Square Statistic = 14.4650 (8 d.f.)c
a

Dependent variable (FILECLAIM) equals 1 when first‐party auto claim filed and 0 when
claim is not filed due only to pseudodeductible reason.
b
Cox and Snell (1989) developed a generalized pseudo‐R2 goodness‐of‐fit measure com‐
parable to the traditional R2 statistic computed in ordinary least squares regressions.
However, the pseudo‐R2 has a maximum value less than one. To permit the pseudo‐R2
statistic to reach a value of one, Nagelkerke (1991) suggested rescaling it by the inverse of
its maximum value, and this is the max‐rescaled R2.
c
The Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) indicates how a
given model fits the data being analyzed. Differences between the observed and expected
number of occurrences in groupings of the data by percentile are summarized by the
Pearson chi‐square statistic, which is compared to a chi‐square probability distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the number groups created less two. The null hypothesis
is that the data fit the specified model well. Therefore, p‐values in excess of .05 would
indicate that the data fit the given model well. The p‐value associated with the reported
statistic of this particular model is 0.0704.

result. The state variables may also be controlling for the variation in other
state‐specific characteristics including subrogation laws, consumer atti‐
tudes towards insurance, degree of urbanization, and others.14

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Observable insurance claims filing rates in closed claims data might
be misleading when used to estimate likelihoods of reporting future losses.
The presence of a pseudodeductible may induce policyholders to avoid
filing claims for otherwise covered losses. Braun, et al. (2006) use Bayesian
probability models to make inferences concerning unobservable claims
filing decisions. They find that the presence of a pseudodeductible in
14
The states of Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania were not estimable
due to exact linear dependency resulting from combinations with various other states
included in the model and the auto law dummy variables. However, the fact that estimates
were not determined for these four state variables does not bias the coefficient estimates for
the remaining variables in the model.
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homeowner’s insurance prompted policyholders to be more selective
when choosing whether to report larger losses as claims. The policyholders
also appear to be more selective about filing homeowner’s insurance claims
when there have been previous claims reported. The large loss and the
previously reported loss characteristics appear to decrease the probability
of a given policyholder to file an insurance claim, giving rise to the
pseudodeductible.
This paper analyzes similar policyholder behavior but in an auto
insurance context. Based on a survey of people injured in auto accidents,
it specifically identifies what is typically unobservable in closed claims
databases: circumstances where someone has suffered a loss but has chosen
not to file an insurance claim. Invaluably, the survey captures the presence
of pseudodeductibles in the sense that it identifies when the reason for not
filing the insurance claim is because of a fear of future premium increases
or because the amount of the loss is too small to bother despite the presence
of coverage.
A logistic regression model is used to determine how the likelihood of
filing an insurance claim relative to avoiding the claim because of a
pseudodeductible is influenced by the primary factors identified by Braun,
et al. (2006), namely, the size of the economic loss suffered and the previous
loss history of the household. In essence, the probability of injured people
to forgo auto insurance indemnity payments given these two characteris‐
tics (and other control variables) is modeled.
The empirical analysis confirms the Braun, et al. (2006) findings for the
most part but with some differences revealed. As a household’s economic
losses generally increase, it appears that it is more likely to file an insurance
claim. However, households experiencing economic losses exceeding a
$1,000 large claim threshold are more selective and are more likely to forgo
filing an insurance claim because of a pseudodeductible compared to
households with losses below the threshold amount. This is consistent with
Braun, et al. Also, somewhat contrary to the findings of Braun, et al., those
who have had one prior accident are less likely to be influenced by a
pseudodeductible (i.e., they are not more selective) compared to someone
with no previous accident history. However, when compared against those
with just one previous accident, those with two or more previous losses
are more selective and therefore less likely to file a claim for pseudodeduct‐
ible reasons. So it appears that selectivity in the claims filing decision does
increase as prior loss history becomes more extensive.
There are interesting results with some of the control variables as well.
In particular, those 55 and older appear to be more likely to file an auto
claim (or, less likely to exhibit a pseudodeductible) than those injured who
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are younger than 55. Females also appear to be more likely to be influenced
by the presence of pseudodeductibles.
The insurance claims function is an important element of any insurer’s
profitability. There is keen interest from both a managerial and a legal
perspective about what drives claims filing decisions. What has in the past
been difficult to research in this area are some of the behavioral aspects of
the decision process itself. Braun, et al. (2006) have hit on one such behav‐
ioral aspect, the application of a pseudodeductible, that has been known
anecdotally to exist but never rigorously researched until their study. This
paper adds to our overall understanding of how pseudodeductibles influ‐
ence claims filing decisions in a first‐party auto context.
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APPENDIX
Table A‐1. Summary Statistics for Dummy Variables Representing
Accident States (N = 1,100)
Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

AK

0.0000

0.00

Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

MT

0.0055

0.07

AL

0.0164

0.13

NC

0.0264

0.16

AR

0.0155

0.12

ND

0.0018

0.04

AZ

0.0127

0.11

NE

0.0055

0.07

CA

0.0873

0.28

NH

0.0018

0.04

CO

0.0273

0.16

NJ

0.0373

0.19

CT

0.0109

0.10

NM

0.0073

0.09

DC

0.0000

0.00

NV

0.0036

0.06

DE

0.0036

0.06

NY

0.0673

0.25

FL

0.0691

0.25

OH

0.0382

0.19

GA

0.0191

0.14

OK

0.0136

0.12

HI

0.0000

0.00

OR

0.0242

0.15

ID

0.0045

0.07

PA

0.0627

0.24

IL

0.0382

0.19

RI

0.0027

0.05

IN

0.0218

0.15

SC

0.0127

0.11

IA

0.0136

0.12

SD

0.0036

0.06

KS

0.0100

0.10

TN

0.0255

0.16

KY

0.0255

0.16

TX

0.0518

0.22

LA

0.0155

0.12

UT

0.0118

0.11

MA

0.0173

0.13

VA

0.0227

0.15

MD

0.0136

0.12

VT

0.0018

0.04

ME

0.0018

0.04

WA

0.0218

0.15

MI

0.0482

0.21

WI

0.0127

0.11

MN

0.0227

0.15

WV

0.0064

0.08

MO

0.0209

0.14

WY

0.0036

0.06

MS

0.0118

0.11

Note: No observations indicated HI as an accident state. DC and AK were identified in
one observation each. However, these observations were necessarily removed in order
for the maximum likelihood estimation iterative process to converge. Minimums and
maximums for all dummy variables are, by definition, 0 and 1, respectively and therefore
are not reported. For all variables, the mean value reflects percentage of total number of
observations.

